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SOME MORE WATTERS, PLEASE: THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S 
NEW PREEMPTION STANDARDS LIGHTEN CONSUMERS’ 
WALLETS 
Courtney Gaughan∗ 
Abstract 
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
precipitates innumerable changes that will both directly and indirectly 
shape the future of the financial industry. This Note addresses two 
important subsets of the Dodd-Frank Act—Section 1044 and Section 
1046—which vitiate the authority of federally chartered banks and 
thrifts to comply with federal laws over state laws. For decades, courts 
have preempted scores of state laws, which are often more strict than 
federal laws, from regulating the operations of national banks and 
federal thrifts. The Supreme Court’s decision in Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, N.A. extended to operating subsidiaries the same preemption 
protection afforded to national banks and financial thrifts, allowing 
parent institutions to operate their subsidiaries uniformly. Now, 
Sections 1044 and 1046 of the Dodd-Frank Act make it more difficult 
for banks and thrifts to escape stringent state laws. For choice of law 
purposes, the new regulations treat subsidiaries the same as individuals 
and nonbank corporations, thereby burdening financial institutions. 
Although the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is to protect consumers from 
predatory banking practices, the new preemption standards in Sections 
1044 and 1046 will ultimately pass increased operating costs on to 
consumers. To prevent consumers from bearing the burden of these 
provisions, this Note urges Congress to reinstate the Watters preemption 
standard for subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1929, the United States slipped into the worst economic 
depression ever to face the nation.1 The people looked to the federal 
government to stabilize the market and guide America back to 
prosperity. The Roosevelt Administration responded to the economic 
crisis in 1933 by passing the New Deal, which augmented the federal 
government’s regulatory powers.2 Now, with America looking to 
overcome the recent recession, Congress has passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,3 a monumental piece 
of legislation that rivals the scope and breadth of the New Deal.4 The 
Dodd-Frank Act purports to resolve and prevent problems posed by 
inadequate regulatory oversight and to eliminate systemic risk in the 
financial industry.5  
Complacent and inadequate oversight of the housing and mortgage 
loan markets characterized the years preceding the recent state of 
economic discord.6 The housing market bubble burst, and the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. THOMAS E. HALL & J. DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL 
DISASTER OF PERVERSE ECONOMIC POLICIES 1–2 (1998).  
 2. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 425 
(1987). 
 3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 4. See Damian Paletta, Fight over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is Signed, 
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704746804575367 
502836650966.html. 
 5. See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial 
System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010).  
 6. See CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: 
LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS ¶ 55 (2010) [hereinafter DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION 
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subsequent subprime mortgage crisis and “freeze-up of the interbank 
lending market” created a domino effect that rippled through financial 
institutions with highly concentrated systemic risk.7 Policymakers’ 
realization that augmented federal controls were needed to reduce 
systemic risk in the financial industry became the impetus for drafting 
the Dodd-Frank Act.8  
Massachusetts Congressman Barney Frank introduced the bill, 
which is now 2,319 pages, to the House of Representatives on 
December 2, 2009, with the stated purpose of effecting financial 
regulatory reform, protecting consumers and investors, and promoting 
financial stability9 by reducing systemic risk in the financial industry.10 
President Barack Obama signed the bill into law on July 21, 2010.11 
Whether the Dodd-Frank Act will succeed in stabilizing the financial 
markets remains uncertain, as many of its implications are not 
immediately apparent.12 Although some provisions became effective 
shortly after the Act was passed, the new preemption standards did not 
go into effect until 180 days after its passage. Now that the standards 
are starting to take effect, banks will soon need to make pivotal 
decisions in response to the changing preemption landscape.13  
The Dodd-Frank Act generates substantial reform for many aspects 
of the banking industry.14 Significantly, the Act alters the application of 
                                                                                                                     
AND ANALYSIS].  
 7. Id.; see also Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 15, 2008), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2008/11/20081115-1.html; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., The Recent Financial Turmoil and Its Economic and Policy Consequences (Oct. 15, 2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071015a.htm. Systemic risk is “the 
risk of a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the financial system caused by a chain 
reaction of failures of major financial institutions.” DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND 
ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 105. 
 8. DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 55. 
 9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
 10. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41384, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 15 
(2010). 
 11. Amanda Becker, Financial Overhaul Has Been Signed, but Lawyers’ Work on Law Is 
Far from Over, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/AR2010072304359.html.  
 12. For a comprehensive overview of the various effective dates of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
see DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 60,001. 
 13. Dodd-Frank Act § 1062(c)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5582).  
 14. See, e.g., id. § 171(b)(1)–(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371) (requiring federal 
banking agencies to establish minimum risk-based leverage and capital requirements for 
financial institutions); id. § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (placing strict regulations 
on banks’ investment activities).  
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federal preemption for laws regulating national banks, federal thrifts, 
and their subsidiaries.15 With entities operating at the state and federal 
levels, the dual banking system is a defining feature of financial markets 
in the United States.16 Although state and national banks coexist 
harmoniously, conflict often arises as to whether national banks are 
subject to the same state laws that govern state-chartered banks.17 
Traditionally, federally chartered banks, thrifts, and their subsidiaries 
had a great deal of leeway to conduct business as they saw fit18 because 
they were exempt from many state laws purporting to regulate banking 
activities.19 The changes effected by the Dodd-Frank Act aim to tighten 
the lenient practices that have contributed to a period of financial 
instability. However, unintended economic consequences precipitated 
by the new preemption standards set out in sections 1044 and 1046 of 
the Act—which alter whether state laws apply to federally chartered 
banks, thrifts, and their subsidiaries—may produce results inconsistent 
with this goal. 
This Note addresses the adjustments that national banks and federal 
thrifts, especially with regard to their subsidiaries, must consider under 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the resulting economic consequences of those 
adjustments. Part I briefly describes federal preemption before the 
passage of the Act and explains how a lack of both effective federal 
regulations and state control over national banking practices contributed 
to the market downturn. Before Dodd-Frank, the states’ lack of control 
over national banking practices raised concerns that consumers were 
defenseless against predatory practices.20 Part II examines Congress’s 
attempt to tighten financial regulation through sections 1044 and 1046 
of the Act, which alters the landscape of federal preemption as it applies 
to national banks, federal thrifts, and especially their subsidiaries. 
Although these provisions have positive effects, they also have the 
unfortunate consequence of overturning Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Id. § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b); id. § 1046 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1465). 
 16. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE 
DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at http://www.nubank.com/bankingtheory/ 
DualBanking.pdf. 
 17. See Emma J. Hodson, Finding the Middle Ground in the Preemption War Between 
States and Federal Financial Institutions: The Practical Limitations on State Farm Bank, F.S.B. 
v. Reardon, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 541, 546–47 (2009). 
 18. See discussion infra Sections II.A–C. 
 19. See, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 534–36 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that 
a New Hampshire law prohibiting expiration dates and fees attached to gift cards was preempted 
by both the National Bank Act and the Home Owner’s Loan Act). 
 20. Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks and Uniform Standards, Remarks Before 
America’s Community Bankers Government Affairs Conference (Mar. 9, 2004), in OCC Q.J., 
June 2004, at 52, available at http://www.occ.gov/static/Publications/qj/qj23-2/QJ23-2.pdf. 
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N.A.,21 in which the Supreme Court held that federal preemption should 
apply to a subsidiary as it would to the parent bank. This will ultimately 
make banking operations a much more expensive endeavor.22 Part III 
discusses the economic effect that overturning Watters will have on 
banks and the public. In the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, federally 
chartered banks and thrifts will have to decide whether the costs of 
compliance with the new preemption standards necessitate rolling up 
their subsidiaries. Internalizing a subsidiary may result in short-term 
business costs; however, maintaining a subsidiary will likely result in 
substantial long-term costs that the entity will have to pass on to 
consumers. Thus, financial institutions face a difficult decision—one 
that may determine the future stability of their business.  
This Note concludes by urging Congress to reinstate Watters as the 
preemption standard for subsidiaries of national banks and federal 
thrifts. Subsidiaries should be regulated to the same extent as their 
parent banks. The preemption reforms under Dodd-Frank sufficiently 
shield banks from many onerous state regulations. However, 
subsidiaries now are denied protection and are wholly vulnerable to the 
whims of the states. Sections 1044(a) and 1046 limit the services 
offered by national banks and increase the cost of financial services. 
Thus, these provisions may disadvantage consumers who would 
otherwise be adequately protected under the Barnett Bank of Marion 
County, N.A. v. Nelson23 standard. 
I.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION BEFORE DODD-FRANK 
A.  Federal Preemption Doctrine: A Brief Overview 
Our government is skillfully crafted around a “system of 
overlapping legal authority”24—both the federal government and the 
fifty individual state governments are vested with the power to 
legislate.25 This strategy creates a dipole that protects both state 
autonomy and national interest.26 Under this system, “conflicts 
inevitably arise” between federal and state laws in a particular field.27 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution stabilizes this internal 
conflict, stating that federal laws “shall be the supreme Law of the 
                                                                                                                     
 21. 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 22. See discussion infra Section II.D. 
 23.  517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
 24. Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U.  
PITT. L. REV. 181, 182 (2004).  
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 26. Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1638 (2006). 
 27. Davis, supra note 24, at 182. 
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Land.”28 This principle is the foundation for the federal preemption 
doctrine, which provides that federal statutes and regulations trump 
state laws that stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”29 
Accordingly, courts have held that state laws that conflict with federal 
laws are “without effect.”30 
Courts recognize two instances that warrant preemption: express 
and implied preemption. Express preemption applies when a federal 
statute explicitly preempts state law; implied preemption exists when 
congressional intent to preempt state law is implicit within the context 
of the statute but unexpressed in the statute itself.31 From implied 
preemption, courts have carved two narrow subcategories: conflict and 
field preemption.32 As a check on federal preemption powers in the 
absence of clear congressional intent to override a state law, a high 
threshold must be met for these implied types of preemption to be 
applicable.33 Conflict preemption derives its authority from the 
Supremacy Clause; whenever a state law actually conflicts with a 
federal law, the state law is preempted and rendered ineffective.34 The 
conflict preemption test is met when “it is impossible for a private party 
                                                                                                                     
 28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 29. John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption of State Banking Law, 18 
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 228 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 
430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977)). 
 30. Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 
725, 746 (1981)). 
 31. Id. (explaining that Congress’s intent to preempt state law may be found in “a statute’s 
express language or through its structure and purpose” (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
U.S. 519, 525 (1977))); see also Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the 
Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2010) (distinguishing between “‘express’ preemption—
where Congress includes in a statute an explicit statement of intent to preempt state or local law 
and sets forth the scope of that preemption—and ‘implied’ preemption, which covers instances 
where Congress’s preemptive intent is not clearly stated”). 
 32. See Duncan, supra note 29, at 232 (discussing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. 
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963), which established the groundwork for conflict 
preemption by explaining that a “holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and 
requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce”); id. at 231 
(citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), which held that an “Act of 
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system 
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject”). 
 33. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal 
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1999) 
(discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 38 (1824), which explains that a state law 
must not pose “a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate 
constitutional repugnancy, that can, by implication, alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right 
of sovereignty” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills 
ed., 1982))). 
 34. See id. at 1134. 
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to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”35 Similarly, field preemption is 
applicable if the state regulation poses an obstacle “to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”36 But field preemption allots even more authority to federal 
agencies; for any given field, a state law is preempted “where the 
scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’”37  
Congress granted the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) maximum 
regulatory authority by drafting the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA) 
to occupy the field of federal thrifts.38 On the other hand, the National 
Bank Act (NBA) neither explicitly preempts state laws nor asserts 
federal government supremacy over the banking industry.39 In the 
seminal banking preemption case of Barnett Bank of Marion County, 
N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court established conflict preemption as 
the proper grounds for eluding regulation by state banking laws.40 This 
standard protected national banks and consumers alike—states could 
                                                                                                                     
 35. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citations omitted) (citing Florida 
Lime, 373 U.S. at 142–43 and quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). In 
deciding whether a state law can survive conflict preemption, the court must determine “whether 
both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field,” not 
whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives. Duncan, supra note 29, at 232 (quoting 
Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000) (quoting Hines, 312 
U.S. at 67) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion of 
O’Connor, J.) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 
(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 
363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding congressional intent to occupy a given field where “the 
pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by the States, where the 
federal interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or where ‘the object sought to be obtained 
by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it . . . reveal the same purpose’” 
(quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1998))); Davis, supra note 24, 
at 199 (“[S]tate law [that] ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment’ of federal objectives 
must yield.” (citing Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712–13 
(1985))). 
 38. See, e.g., L. Richard Fischer, Financial Services and Federal Preemption, in 14TH 
ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE, at 611 (PLI Corp. Law & 
Practice Course Handbook Ser. No. 18521, 2009) (citing Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 
F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the OTS’s occupation of the field preempted plaintiff’s 
state law claim against a mortgage company)). 
 39. See, e.g., Mwantembe v. TD Bank, N.A., 669 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(stating that express preemption is not an appropriate basis for determining that a state law 
regulating bank-issued gift cards is preempted by the NBA because “[w]hen it enacted the NBA, 
Congress did not expressly preempt state laws in the banking business”). 
 40. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1996); see also 
infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
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regulate banking activities so long as they did not conflict with federal 
directives and banks could easily determine which laws applied to 
them.41  
B.  National Banks: Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson 
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks and federal thrifts had 
traditionally enjoyed broad preemption of state laws as a result of 
various factors.42 For instance, many courts broadly construed statutory 
provisions to support what came to be a liberal preemption standard.43 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal 
administrative body governing national banks,44 had extensive power to 
preempt state laws regulating national banks and their operating 
subsidiaries.45 Consequently, national banks and subsidiaries were 
subject to uniform federal regulation rather than a patchwork of diverse 
state laws.46  
For more than a decade preceding the 2010 passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson headlined 
the preemption trend for national banks. In Barnett Bank, the U.S. 
Supreme Court was confronted with conflicting state and federal laws 
purporting to regulate the sale of insurance by national banks. Barnett 
Bank, a federally chartered financial institution, violated Florida law by 
selling insurance through a branch in Belleview, Florida—a small town 
with fewer than 5,000 people.47 The bank justified its actions by citing a 
federal law that explicitly permitted national banks to act as insurance 
brokers and to sell insurance in “any place [with a population] . . . [of 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., Kroske v. US Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting State 
Farm Bank’s claim that the NBA preempted a Washington antidiscrimination law because the 
state law did not fully conflict with the NBA). 
 42. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 566 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the NBA and HOLA preempted a California state law regulating ATM 
fees); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding 
that the NBA and HOLA preempt state law requiring credit card issuers to distribute minimum 
payment warnings to consumers). 
 43. See, e.g., National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.); 12 U.S.C. § 484 (granting the federal government broad visitorial 
powers); Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1461–70 (2006); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 
N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007) (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32). 
 44. See generally About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 45. This power is derived from the NBA, which “provides that banks shall have the power 
‘[t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of 
banking.’” Watters, 550 U.S. at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006)).  
 46. Donald C. Lampe, Federal Preemption and the Future of Mortgage Loan Regulation, 
59 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1208 (2004). 
 47. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 29. 
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not more than] five thousand.”48 The Court found that the bank’s 
actions, although in violation of Florida law, were legally permissible.49 
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, concluded that a state 
law can survive federal preemption only where “doing so does not 
prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its 
powers.”50 Because the Florida law prevented Barnett Bank from 
exercising its federal power to sell insurance in a small town, the Court 
held the state law preempted.51 Further solidifying preemption rights for 
federal banks, the Court noted that the history of national bank 
legislation “is one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and 
incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority not normally 
limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.”52 
Thus, the Barnett Bank decision subjects national banks to state 
consumer laws, unless the state law prevents or significantly interferes 
with the national bank’s federally allocated powers.53  
The OCC’s broad interpretation of the Barnett Bank standard paved 
the way for increasingly expansive federal preemption authority over 
banks and their subsidiaries.54 In contrast to the exact language used by 
the Court, which stated that federal laws trump state laws that “prevent 
or significantly interfere” with execution of national bank powers, the 
OCC construed the Barnett Bank decision to preempt all state laws that 
“obstruct, impair, or condition” the power of national banks.55 The 
OCC’s interpretation of Barnett Bank therefore lowers the standard for 
finding that a state law interferes with a national bank’s operations.56  
Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Barnett Bank, the OCC 
adopted two sweeping, controversial rules in 2004 preventing specific 
categories of state laws from regulating national banks.57 The “Banking 
Activities and Operations” rule preempted state laws that were thought 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 28 (alterations in original) (quoting Act of Sept. 7, 1916, Pub. L. 270, ch. 461, 
39 Stat. 752, 753 (1916) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2006))). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 33. 
 51. See id. at 37. 
 52. Id. at 32. 
 53. Duncan, supra note 29, at 241. 
 54. See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal 
Preemption of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 905–06 (2008). 
 55. Catherine M. Brennan & Meghan S. Musselman, Brave New World of Bank 
Preemption, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Sept. 2010, at 3 (quoting Barnett Bank, 517 
U.S. at 33). 
 56. Id. (“[U]se of the terms ‘impair’ and ‘condition’ seemed to require a lower threshold 
of interference with national bank activities in order to preempt state laws.”). 
 57. See Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank 
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 985–87 
(introducing the Banking Activities Rule, 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–08, 34.4 (2010); Visitorial 
Powers Rule, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2010)). 
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to “‘obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully 
exercise’ its federally granted powers,” including state laws limiting 
consumer loans, real estate loans, and banks’ deposit-taking powers.58 
The “Visitorial Powers”59 rule defined the scope of activities for which 
the OCC had exclusive visitorial powers over national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries.60 With eight listed exceptions, the rule explained 
that “the OCC ha[d] exclusive visitorial authority with respect to the 
content and conduct of activities authorized for national banks under 
Federal law.”61  
Although the OCC alleged that the 2004 rules merely codified 130 
years of existing case law and regulations,62 the 2004 rules were met 
with a “‘unanimous and strong outcry’ from state organizations and 
consumer groups” claiming that the rules greatly diminished state 
regulators’ ability to protect consumers from fraud and abuse by 
shielding national banks from important state regulations.63 Indeed, the 
broad preemption categories listed in the rules expanded the OCC’s 
preemption powers to a near de facto preemption of state laws 
regulating national banks’ operational activities and visitorial powers—
severely restricting states’ authority to control national banks within 
their boundaries.64 Although amended slightly to assuage the concerns 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 985 (quoting Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and 
Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1911–12 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–08 & 
34.4)). 
 59. Id. at 985–86 (citing Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 
2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000)). “The term ‘visitorial powers’ refers to the power of a 
regulator or superintendent to inspect, examine, supervise, and regulate the affairs of an entity.”  
Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Visitorial Powers Final Rule, 
Questions and Answers (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-
issuances/news-releases/2004/2004-3eVisitorialruleQNAs.pdf. 
 60. For an in-depth discussion of “visitorial powers,” see Matthew J. Nance, Note, The 
OCC’s Exclusive Visitorial Authority over National Banks After Clearing House Ass’n v. 
Cuomo, 87 TEX. L. REV. 811 (2009). 
 61. Visitorial Powers, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3) (2010). 
 62. Press Release, Robert M. Garsson, Comptroller of the Currency Adm’r of Nat’l 
Banks, OCC First Senior Deputy Comptroller Julie L. Williams Tells House Panel New 
Regulations Grounded in Federal Law, Court Precedent and Constitution (Jan. 28, 2004), 
available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/news-releases/2004/nr-occ-2004-8.pdf.  
 63. Brief of Amicus Curiae North American Securities Administrators Ass’n, Inc., in 
Support of Appellant Burke and in Support of Reversal at 12–13, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. 
Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2006) (No. 04-3770-CV), available at http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/ 
WachoviaBurkeBrief.pdf (citing Review of the National Bank Preemption Rules: Hearings 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (opening 
statement of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes)). 
 64. See Brennan & Musselman, supra note 55, at 3 (“The OCC’s 2004 preemption 
rule . . . afforded national banks the ability to preempt virtually all state laws affecting lending 
and banking activities.”). 
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of opponents, the 2004 rules solidified the OCC’s extensive authority.65  
C.  Field Preemption for Federal Thrifts 
Just as the OCC is responsible for overseeing national banks, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation created the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) to “supervise, charter and regulate” federal savings 
and loan associations, which are also known as federal thrifts.66 The 
scope of a thrift’s business is somewhat narrower than that of a bank. 
Federal thrifts primarily engage in consumer lending and, unlike banks, 
may not make commercial, corporate, business or agricultural loans that 
exceed 20% of the thrift’s total assets.67 Congress gave the OTS plenary 
powers under HOLA68 to regulate federal thrifts.69 Before Dodd-Frank, 
HOLA sections 4(a) and 5(a) furnished the OTS with the ability to 
“occup[y] the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings 
associations.”70 Like the 2004 rules, categories of state laws preempted 
under HOLA or OTS regulations were enumerated in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 560.2(b).71 However, the mechanical analysis applied under 12 C.F.R. 
§ 560.272 allowed the OTS to override state laws for unenumerated 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 1 (concluding that the 2004 rules “gave national banks virtually unfettered 
authority to rely on preemption to ignore state laws on a variety of topics”). 
 66. About the OTS: History, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=History 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 67. See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 
YALE J. ON REG. 143, 167 (2009). 
 68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1463(a), 1464(a) (2006). 
 69. Fischer, supra note 38, at 611 (discussing preemption under Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. 
Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Through HOLA, Congress gave the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (‘OTS’) broad authority to issue regulations governing thrifts.”)). 
 70. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2010) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (2006)); see also 
Lyons Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 17 (N.D. Ill. 1974) 
(finding that regulations passed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board under authority of 
HOLA were not limited by state laws addressing thrift branches). 
 71. See also 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). 
 72. Systematic application of the preemption test for federal thrifts is exemplified in 
Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008). In Silvas, the Ninth Circuit 
considered whether E*Trade Mortgage was bound by a California law requiring subsidiaries of 
federal thrifts to refund “lock-in” fees to mortgage applicants who had cancelled their mortgage 
loan transaction within three days. Id. at 1003. The initial issue raised by the court was whether 
the California law “as applied, [was] a type of state law contemplated in the list under paragraph 
(b) of 12 C.F.R. § 560.2.” Id. at 1006. The court adhered strictly to the § 560.2 framework, 
which establishes a presumption in favor of preemption rather than against it. Id. at 1005–06. 
California’s law regulating E*Trade’s use of “lock-in” fees fell into the category of state laws 
imposing requirements on loan-related fees under § 560.2(b)(5). Id. at 1006–07. The court 
concluded that because the law fit into paragraph (b), it was unnecessary to analyze whether its 
impact was more than incidental; once a state law fits into a paragraph (b) category, the law is 
preempted. Id. The Silvas decision is indicative of the strong presumption towards field 
preemption afforded to OTS and HOLA regulations. V. Gerard Comizio & Helen Y. Lee, The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Federal Preemption 
11
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categories as well:  
When analyzing the status of state laws under § 560.2, 
the first step will be to determine whether the type of law in 
question is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will 
end there; the law is preempted. If the law is not covered by 
paragraph (b), the next question is whether the law affects 
lending. If it does, then, in accordance with paragraph (a), 
the presumption arises that the law is preempted. This 
presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be 
shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c). For these 
purposes, paragraph (c) is intended to be interpreted 
narrowly. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
preemption.73 
Courts have interpreted HOLA as occupying the field for matters 
listed in section (b) pertaining to federal thrifts.74 HOLA gave the OTS 
nearly unfettered discretion over realty regulations.75 HOLA’s 
comprehensive language is evidence that “Congress intended the federal 
scheme to be exclusive, leaving no room for state regulations, 
conflicting or complementary.”76  
The OTS’ power to occupy the field of the thrift industry was 
intended to “enhance safety and soundness and enable federal savings 
associations to conduct their operations in accordance with best 
practices by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to the public free from 
undue regulatory duplication and burden.”77 This purpose is undermined 
by the Dodd-Frank Act because thrifts now face hurdles that are more 
burdensome to compliance than ever.78 The Act produces major 
                                                                                                                     
for National Banks and Federal Thrifts, PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT, at 5 (Jan. 2011), 
available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1668.pdf?wt.mc_ID=1668.pdf. 
(citing Silvas, 514 F.3d at 1004–05). 
 73. Silvas, 514 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 
50,966–67 (Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2)).  
 74. See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“The Office of Thrift Supervision has exclusive authority to regulate the savings and 
loan industry in the sense of fixing fees (including penalties), setting licensing requirements, 
prescribing certain terms in mortgages, establishing requirements for disclosure of credit 
information to customers, and setting standards for processing and servicing mortgages.”). 
 75. Flagg v. Yonkers Savs. & Loan Ass’n, FA, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2005) (“This is 
an extremely broad grant of power that provides ample authority for the Director’s efforts to 
enforce consistent, nationwide regulations affecting lending practices, by preempting, inter alia, 
‘state laws purporting to impose requirements regarding . . .  [e]scrow accounts.’” (quoting 12 
C.F.R. § 560.2(b))). 
 76. Report of Carolyn J. Buck, Cassese v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 2003 WL 25430371, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003) (No. 2:05CV02724). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See infra Sections II.C–D. 
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changes in governance of federal thrifts. Effective ninety days after the 
passage of Dodd-Frank, the OTS was eliminated and all of its 
responsibilities were transferred to the OCC.79 Consistent with this shift, 
section 1046(a) amends HOLA so that thrift preemption determinations 
will now be “made in accordance with the laws and legal standards 
applicable to national banks.”80 Thus, Dodd-Frank strips away the field 
preemption and uniformity that federal thrifts once enjoyed.  
The uniformity of federal thrift regulations furthered “both the ‘best 
practices’ and safety and soundness objectives of HOLA by enabling 
federal thrifts to deliver low-cost credit to the public free from undue 
regulatory duplication and burden.”81 This is because a lower cost of 
doing business allowed thrifts to maintain low costs for their services.82  
For example, in State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. Burke,83 a Connecticut law 
requiring mortgage brokers to “be licensed by the State, pay annual 
fees, meet bond, net worth and minimum experience requirements” was 
blocked by the OTS’ regulatory authority.84 The business costs of 
complying with the Connecticut law would be high and oppressive, 
whereas adequate federal oversight could achieve the same level of 
consumer protection without additional business costs.85 
D.  Heightened Power: Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 
The trend toward increasing preemption powers culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.86 The 
Court held that Wachovia Mortgage, a subsidiary of Wachovia Bank, 
was not required to comply with Michigan’s registration and inspection 
requirements pertaining to mortgage brokers and lenders because these 
regulations would be superseded by the National Bank Act when 
applied to parent banks.87 Adhering closely to the wording of the NBA88 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 313, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413). 
 80. Id. § 1046(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465). 
 81. Report of Carolyn J. Buck, supra note 76, at 3 (quoting Lending and Investment, 61 
Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,965 (Sept. 30, 1996)). 
 82. See infra Part III. 
 83. 445 F. Supp. 2d 207 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 84. Id. at 212. 
 85. See Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins, National Bank Act Preemption: The 
OCC’s New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to Consumer Protection or the Dual Banking System, 
23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365, 409 (2004) (explaining that the cost of complying with a 
myriad of state laws ultimately increases business costs, “thereby making affordable credit 
unavailable or less available to many, if not most, residents and potential residents in the state”). 
 86. Financial Regulatory Reform—Conference Report Rolls Back Federal Preemption, 
SNR DENTON, 2 (July 12, 2010), http://www.snrdenton.com/pdf.aspx?page=3272&template= 
article_no_contacts_pdf (citing Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007)). 
 87. Watters, 550 U.S. at 8–9, 13, 15–18.  
 88. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3) (defining a financial subsidiary as a company that “engages 
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and reasoning that it has never been interpreted as applying solely to 
parent banks, the Watters Court concluded that national bank 
subsidiaries were entitled to the same protection as their parent banks.89 
Watters breathed renewed life into 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006—a regulation 
promulgated by the OCC which states that “[u]nless otherwise provided 
by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to national bank 
operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the 
parent national bank.”90 This holding was a decisive victory for the 
federal government, as it ensured the OCC’s authority to preempt 
conflicting state laws pertaining to both national banks and operating 
subsidiaries.91 Watters was the zenith of broadened preemption powers 
that had been growing since the Court’s Barnett Bank decision.92  
Subsidiaries of federal thrifts received the same protection that 
subsidiaries of national banks received under Watters.93 In State Farm 
Bank, FSB v. Reardon,94 the court extended preemption protection to 
subsidiaries of federal thrifts, reasoning that “Watters stands for the 
proposition that when considering whether a state law is preempted by 
federal banking law, the courts should focus on whether the state law is 
regulating ‘the exercise of a national bank’s power’ not on whether the 
entity exercising that power is the bank itself.”95 The State Farm 
decision illustrates the OTS’s virtually unrestrained discretion to make 
preemption determinations.96  
II.  ALTERING THE PREEMPTION LANDSCAPE: THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The landscape of national bank and federal thrift preemption 
standards is about to undergo a tremendous shift, with implementation 
of the Dodd-Frank provisions looming large on the horizon. Because the 
Act’s preemption provisions will come into effect “not earlier than 180 
                                                                                                                     
solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted 
subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national 
banks” (emphasis added)).  
 89. Watters, 550 U.S. at 18–19. 
 90. Id. at 20 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. For a more exhaustive analysis of the Watters decision and its consequences, see 
generally G. Marcus Cole, Protecting Consumers from Consumer Protection: Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 251. 
 92. SNR DENTON, supra note 86, at 2. 
 93. Fischer, supra note 38, at 39 (discussing State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. Reardon, 512 F. 
Supp. 2d 1107, 1121–22 (S.D. Ohio 2007), rev’d, 539 F. 3d 336 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 94. 512 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Ohio 2007, rev’d, 539 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 95. 539 F.3d at 345–46 (quoting Watters, 550 U.S. at 18); see also WFS Fin., Inc. v. 
Dean, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1025 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding thrift subsidiaries are governed to 
the same extent as their parent institutions; subsidiaries are “regulated by the office in the same 
manner as their parent organizations and equally exempt from state regulation”). 
 96. State Farm Bank, 539 F.3d at 349. The OTS exercised field preemption power over 
both thrift institutions and their subsidiaries.  
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days, nor later than 12 months, after the date of enactment,”97 national 
banks have little time to weigh the pros and cons of the available 
methods of compliance. The enactment of section 1044, pertaining to 
national banks,98 and section 1046, pertaining to federal thrifts,99 will 
effect significant change in the preemption arena. These changes carry 
weighty ramifications that will negatively affect consumers, whom the 
Dodd-Frank Act was designed to protect.100 This Part will discuss the 
changes brought about by the Dodd-Frank Act and will examine the 
impact these changes will have on financial markets.  
A.  Solidifying Barnett Bank Through Section 1044  
Section 1044 of the Dodd-Frank Act restricts the OCC’s preemption 
powers by forbidding the agency from relying on a vast body of case 
law and regulations to preempt categories of state laws.101 Unable to 
depend on the preexisting preemption standards, national banks and 
their subsidiaries now face greater uncertainty as to whether their 
actions will be subject to state or federal law.102 Dodd-Frank attempts to 
clarify by adding Section 5136C to the NBA: “State Law Preemption 
Standards For National Banks and Subsidiaries Clarified.”103 This new 
section scales back the authority of the OCC’s 2004 rules; sections 
5136C(b)(1)(A)–(C) explicitly provide three instances when a federal 
law will preempt a state law exercising authority over national banks. 
Under the new provision, a state consumer financial law will be 
preempted only if: 
(A) application of a State consumer financial law would 
have a discriminatory effect on national banks, in 
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered 
by that State; 
(B) in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida 
Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25 (1996), the 
State consumer financial law prevents or significantly 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1062(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2040 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5582).  
 98. Id. § 1044(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
 99. Id. § 1046 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465). 
 100. DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 105. 
 101. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
 102. See infra notes 150–58 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty caused by 
differing state laws and how that will affect banks’ decisions to maintain their subsidiaries). 
 103. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044(a), § 5136C (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
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interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its 
powers; and any preemption determination under this 
subparagraph may be made by a court, or by regulation or 
order of the Comptroller of the Currency on a case-by-case 
basis, in accordance with applicable law; or  
(C) the State consumer financial law is preempted by a 
provision of Federal law other than this title.104 
Although this provision was intended to “clarify” current law, 
section 1044 actually raises a host of new questions as to when 
preemption is appropriate. In particular, the addition of section 
5136C(b)(1)(B) to the NBA likely will raise many issues as banks seek 
to preserve their current banking practices. Consequently, the very 
language of section 1044 imposes a great burden on the OCC’s 
preemption of state laws; a state law will prevail unless the OCC is able 
to prove at least one of the narrow prongs listed in section 5136C.105  
Section 5136C(b)(1)(B) restores the Barnett Bank standard as the 
primary standard for federal preemption: a state law that “prevents or 
significantly interferes” with a national bank’s exercise of its power will 
be preempted.106 Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd explained that 
section 5136C(b)(1)(B) was intended to solidify the Barnett Bank 
standard. In a colloquy between Senator Dodd and Delaware Senator 
Thomas Carper, Senator Dodd stated: “There should be no doubt that 
the legislation codifies the preemption standard stated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”107 Reverting to the Barnett Bank 
paradigm requires that the OCC first make a determination as to 
whether the state consumer financial law “significantly interfere[s]” 
with the OCC rules.108 Read in juxtaposition with the introductory 
clause, section 5136C(b) affirms that, on a case-by-case basis, a state 
law will be preempted only if it is determined that the state law prevents 
or significantly interferes with the exercise of a national bank’s 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 105. Id. (“State consumer financial laws are preempted, only if . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 106. Id.; see also Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). 
 107. 156 CONG. REC. S5870, S5902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Christopher Dodd). 
 108. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33; see also N.Y. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. Levin, 999 F. 
Supp. 716, 719 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The only potential issue of fact is whether or not the 
imposition of New York Insurance Law § 2501 on the plaintiffs ‘significantly interferes’ with 
the exercise of their powers under federal law. If so, then federal law will pre-empt the state 
regulation, and the state provision may not be imposed upon the federal bank.”) (citing Barnett 
Bank, 517 U.S. at 33)); Fischer, supra note 38, at 36 (referencing SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 
F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that “[b]ecause the New Hampshire CPA ‘significantly 
interferes’ with USB’s statutory power, it is preempted by the National Bank Act”)). 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/4
2011] SOME MORE WATTERS, PLEASE 1475 
 
powers.109  
Despite allegedly codifying existing case law, the prevailing 
preemption test significantly hampers the OCC’s preemption discretion. 
The OCC will no longer be able to establish a categorical basis for 
preemption as it did previously with the 2004 “Banking Activities and 
Operations” and “Visitorial Powers” rules.110 Rather, preemption 
determinations will be subjected to scrutiny of the effects of a 
“particular state consumer financial law on any national bank that is 
subject to that law, or the law of any other State with substantively 
equivalent terms.”111 Consequently, a challenged state law will be 
evaluated only with respect to its effect in that particular state.112 In-
depth, fact-based analysis will likely perpetuate differing holdings 
across state lines, causing much confusion for large banks.113 
Accordingly, the OCC’s broadly constructed 2004 rules no longer 
preempt entire categories of state consumer financial laws; rather, 
preemption is determined in a narrow vacuum to analyze the impact an 
individual state law has on a national bank’s exercise of power.114 
B.  New Hurdles to Preemption Under Section 1044 
The Dodd-Frank Act further restricts the OCC’s regulatory authority 
by mandating a higher standard of scrutiny for preemption 
determinations. Section 5136C(b)(3)(B), under which the OCC must 
consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection before 
                                                                                                                     
 109. “Case-by-case basis” analysis is defined by Dodd-Frank § 1044 as a determination 
“made by the Comptroller concerning the impact of a particular State consumer financial law on 
any national bank that is subject to that law, or the law of any other State with substantively 
equivalent terms.” Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044, § 5136C(b)(3)(A) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 25b). 
 110. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text (discussing the OCC’s 2004 rules); 
Brennan & Musselman, supra note 55, at 3–4. 
 111. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044, § 5136C(b)(3)(A) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b) 
(emphasis added). 
 112. Comizio & Lee, supra note 72, at 8; Nancy L. Perkins & Beth S. DeSimone, Has 
Financial Regulatory Reform Materially Altered the Preemption Landscape for Federally 
Chartered Institutions?, 127 BANKING L.J. 759, 762 (2010). 
 113. There are many intricacies in state laws that would need to be addressed for each state 
in which the bank does business. For example, Connecticut’s Fair Acts and Practices law 
prohibits banks from advertising that “refinancing preexisting debt with a high cost home loan 
will reduce a borrower’s aggregate monthly debt payment without also disclosing that the high 
cost home loan may increase” the total amount owed and the number of monthly installments. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-746e (West 2001). On the other hand, Oklahoma law states more 
broadly that banks, “with respect to any home equity account,” may not “refer to such credit as 
‘free-money’” or any other term determined to be misleading. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A       
§ 3-312(9) (1996). 
 114. Brennan & Musselman, supra note 55, at 4 (“It seems clear that the OCC preemption 
rules will fall away. . . . The Preemption Standard, with its requirement for case-by-case 
determination disfavors, if not outright prohibits, broad regulations of general applicability.”). 
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overriding state law, places significant burdens on the OCC’s regulatory 
scheme.115 Section 5136C(c) prohibits preemption “unless substantial 
evidence” is produced to support “the specific findings regarding the 
preemption of such provision in accordance” with Barnett Bank.116 This 
heightened requirement deters superfluous OCC preemption 
determinations and prevents the OCC from maintaining a liberal 
interpretation of Barnett Bank that essentially implements field 
preemption of categories of state laws.117 Section 1044(a) requires that 
the OCC conduct a review within five years after a preemption 
determination has been made and “at least once during each 5-year 
period thereafter.”118 Upon conducting a review, the OCC must publish 
a notice with the Federal Register announcing its decision to either 
continue or rescind preemption.119 Such obstacles were created to 
subject the OCC to additional scrutiny, thereby preventing abuse of 
federal preemption powers.120 Consumers will benefit from these added 
safeguards because the OCC will be deterred from preempting state 
laws that do not “prevent or significantly interfere”121 with the powers 
of national banks; states, which have “a legitimate interest in protecting 
the rights of their consumers, businesses and communities” will be able 
to enact laws for the benefit of their citizens.122 With the inclusion of 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(b)(3)(B). 
 116. Id. sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(c). 
 117. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority 
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 250 (2004). Indeed, 
The OCC’s “obstruct, impair, or condition” standard for preemption appears 
nowhere in Barnett. Unless it is overturned by Congress or the courts, the 
OCC’s self-created preemption standard will obviously have a far greater 
impact in preempting state laws than the “prevent or significantly interfere” 
rule that the Supreme Court actually adopted in Barnett. Under the OCC’s 
newly-invented standard, state laws would be preempted if they have any 
impact on national banks other than merely an “incidental” effect that “makes it 
practicable” for national banks to conduct their business. In contrast, under the 
Barnett standard state laws apply to national banks unless they either prevent or 
significantly interfere with the exercise of a congressionally-authorized power.  
Id. at 248 (footnote omitted) (quoting Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and 
Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1910, 1912 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 34)).  
 118. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(d)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
 119. Id. 
 120. DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 4640, at 508–09. 
 121.  Wilmarth, supra note 117, at 230 (emphasis removed) (quoting Barnett Bank of 
Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996)). 
 122. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074) (internal quotation marks omitted); Linda Singer, Zachary Best & 
Nina Simon, Breaking Down Financial Reform: A Summary of the Major Consumer Protection 
Portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 14 J. CONSUMER 
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these provisions, section 1044 promotes the overarching goal of the 
Dodd-Frank Act: “to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices.”123 However, Congress went a step too far in furtherance of 
this goal. These provisions adequately serve the interests of 
consumers—it was unnecessary for the Act to leave subsidiaries 
vulnerable to a landslide of state regulations.124  
C.  Elimination of the Office of Thrift Supervision and Substantial 
Changes to Section 1046 for Federal Thrifts 
The impact that the Dodd-Frank Act has on federal thrifts is far 
greater than its impact on national banks. Notably, section 313 abolishes 
the OTS125 and section 312 transfers all of the OTS’s responsibilities 
and authority to the OCC.126 As a result, federal thrifts will be subject to 
stricter preemption standards.127 Federal thrifts no longer have the 
benefit of comprehensive protection from state laws.128 Section 1046(a) 
of the Act dictates the new preemption standard for federal thrifts and 
their operating subsidiaries. This provision amends HOLA by adding a 
new Section 6: “State law preemption standards for Federal savings 
association clarified.”129 The newly added section severely restricts the 
OTS’s power to preempt state consumer financial laws that purport to 
regulate federal thrifts. Significantly, section 6(a) states that all 
preemption determinations for federal thrifts and their subsidiaries 
“shall be made in accordance with the laws and legal standards 
applicable to national banks regarding the preemption of State law.”130 
Accordingly, federal thrifts, which once relied on the OTS’s field 
preemption authority,131 are now subject to the OCC’s Barnett Bank test 
for preemption.132 Consistent with 5136C(b)(1)(B) of the amended 
National Bank Act,133 HOLA § 6(b) requires preemption determinations 
to be made on a case-by-case basis, rather than broad field preemption 
                                                                                                                     
& COM. L. 2, 10 (2010) (“State officials are consumers’ first responders; they are closer to 
consumers and often the first to become aware of new and devastating consumer scams.”). 
 123. Dodd-Frank Act § 1376 pmbl. 
 124. See infra Part III. 
 125. Dodd-Frank Act § 313 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413). 
 126. Id. § 312(b)(2)(B)(i)(II) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412). 
 127. DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 4650, at 510. 
 128. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 129. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1046(a), § 6 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465). 
 130. Id. sec. 1046(a), § 6(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465). 
 131. See Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 132. DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 4650, at 510. 
 133. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(b)(1)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b) 
(“[A]ny preemption determination under this subparagraph may be made by a court, or by 
regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance 
with applicable law.”). 
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of whole categories of state laws: “Notwithstanding the authorities 
granted under sections 4 and 5, this Act does not occupy the field in any 
area of State law.”134 As a result of the HOLA amendments, laws 
regulating federal thrifts and subsidiaries will now be analyzed under 
the more state-friendly preemption standards set forth in Dodd-Frank.  
D.  Overturning Watters: Exposing Subsidiaries to a Patchwork of 
Legislation 
Perhaps the greatest consequence of the Dodd-Frank Act is its new 
preemption standard for national bank and thrift subsidiaries. Under the 
Watters decision, national banks’ operating subsidiaries enjoyed the 
same expansive preemption rights as parent banks: “State laws apply to 
national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws 
apply to the parent national bank.”135 However, the Dodd-Frank Act 
does away with this holding and gives ample discretion to state 
policymakers. For instance, section 1044(e) states:  
[A] State consumer financial law shall apply to a subsidiary 
or affiliate of a national bank (other than a subsidiary or 
affiliate that is chartered as a national bank) to the same 
extent that the State consumer financial law applies to any 
person, corporation, or other entity subject to such State 
law.136  
This provision effectively overturns Watters137  and treats bank 
subsidiaries as people and nonbank businesses, rather than as federally 
chartered banks. Effectively separating subsidiaries from parent banks 
exposes the subsidiaries to a patchwork of state laws and denies them 
the protections they were once afforded under Watters.138  
Thrift subsidiaries face the greatest compliance challenges. Once 
answering to a single regulatory body with field preemption powers, 
thrift subsidiaries may now theoretically answer to fifty different 
legislatures. Thrift subsidiaries, like bank subsidiaries, can no longer 
rely on precedent set by court decisions. Most courts preempting state 
laws in favor of federal subsidiary regulations based their holding on 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. sec. 1046(a), § 6(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465); DODD-FRANK: LAW, 
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, ¶ 4650, at 511. 
 135. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20 (2007) (quoting Investment 
Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,786 (July 2, 2001) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044, § 5136C(e) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). 
 137. B. Rush Smith III, Thad H. Westbrook & Sarah B. Nielson, Litigation Implications of 
the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, BUS. L. TODAY, at 1, 4 (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.nelsonmullins.com/DocumentDepot/smith_westbrook_BLT.pdf. 
 138. Id. 
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whether the state law would be preempted for the parent bank. 
Accordingly, these courts applied the Watters holding.  
III.  ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MORE STRINGENT PREEMPTION 
STANDARDS 
National banks and federal thrifts will undoubtedly feel the 
consequences of the Dodd-Frank Act for years to come.139 Without the 
blanket protection of uniform federal regulations, national banks and 
thrifts are vulnerable to a myriad of state laws, which may vary greatly 
across state lines.140 Dodd-Frank’s codification of the Barnett Bank 
standard and its requirement that preemption analysis be made on a 
case-by-case basis141 will likely result in confusion over whether federal 
or state law applies. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, by retracting some of the preemption powers 
claimed by federal agencies, allows states to exercise more control over 
banks and thrifts within their borders.142 This is especially true of 
subsidiaries, which will be subject to state laws to the same extent that 
the laws govern people and businesses, rather than national banks.143 
Consequently, state laws regulating subsidiaries will be given the same 
presumption against preemption that is given to matters in which the 
government has not historically had a “significant federal presence.”144 
The resulting decentralization of preemption powers eliminates much of 
the systemic risk that plagued the industry in the years leading up to the 
recent economic crisis.145 Proponents of the Dodd-Frank amendments to 
the NBA and HOLA argue that state policymakers are in the best 
position to observe and react to banking activities within their states and 
that Dodd-Frank allows states to enact regulations that benefit state 
consumers and state banks.146 
Although the Act may protect consumers and state banks from 
abuse of federal government power, consumers will be negatively 
affected by the increased uncertainty that the financial industry now 
faces.147 Opposite a multitude of state laws, national banks and thrifts 
are exposed to demanding regulations affecting their day-to-day 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Brennan & Musselman, supra note 55, at 1. 
 140. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
 141. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(b)(1)(B); id. sec. 1046(a), § 6(a). 
 142. Brennan & Musselman, supra note 55, at 2–3. 
 143. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1044(a), § 5136C(e); id. sec. 1046(a), § 6. 
 144. Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United  
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145. See Clyde Mitchell, Domestic Banking: The Federal Reserve as Systemic Regulator, 
N.Y. L.J. Apr. 8, 2009, at 3. 
 146. See Singer, Best & Simon, supra note 122, at 10–11. 
 147. SNR DENTON, supra note 86, at 1. 
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business.148 Congress’s solution ignores the fact that many financial 
consumers will find it difficult to afford pricey mortgages and high 
interest rates resulting from the banks’ attempts to remain profitable. 
Compliance with new state laws will be costly, especially for mid-sized 
financial institutions.149 
Among the most significant decisions that national banks and thrifts 
need to make is whether to incorporate their subsidiaries.150 Mid-sized 
banks doing business in numerous states might not have the capital to 
cover the increased costs of compliance with multiple state laws—“to 
the extent that banks are subject to additional state regulation with costs 
that they can’t or won’t pass along to the consumer, then [banks] will 
put out of those states.”151 Financial institutions can opt to “roll up” 
their operating subsidiaries and make them bank divisions—this would 
ensure that the same preemption standards that apply to the parent bank 
also apply to the former subsidiary.152 However, the price of “rolling-
up” a subsidiary can be high. Banks will lose the flexibility to liquidate 
the subsidiary in the future because “it is much easier to sell a 
subsidiary than a division of a bank.”153  
Moreover, incorporating a subsidiary would require restructuring if 
the “subsidiary [had] a different salary and benefits structure than the 
bank.”154 Merging subsidiaries into parent banks may also cause 
collateral damage to the communities in which the wholly owned 
subsidiaries operate.155 Numerous national bank subsidiaries have 
implemented Community Development Corporations (CDCs), which, 
according to the OCC, greatly benefit “declining neighborhoods” that 
require “long-term commitment of resources to facilitate 
revitalization.”156 Banks and thrifts that are unwilling to incorporate 
their subsidiaries but wish to avoid confusion may request an advisory 
opinion from the OCC as to whether the state regulation in question will 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See Karl D. Belgum & Krista Bell, Dodd-Frank Act Alters Preemption Rules for 
National Banks and Federal Thrifts, NIXON PEABODY LLP (July 28, 2010) 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/services_pubdetail.asp?ID=3425&SID=102.  
 149. Id. 
 150. New Financial Regulatory Reform Act: Has It Materially Altered the Preemption 
Landscape for Federally Chartered Institutions?, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, 3–4 (July 2010), 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/AdvisoryFinal%20Financial%20Reform%20
Legislation-Has%20it%20Materially%20Altered%20the%20Preemption_71610.pdf. 
 151. Interview with Michael Rave, Partner, Day Pitney LLP (Jan. 25, 2011). 
 152. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 150, at 3–4. 
 153. Interview with Robert Taylor III, Partner, Day Pitney LLP (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Formation of a National Bank Subsidiary Community Development Corporation, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/community-affairs/resource-
directories/public-welfare-investments/formation-of-subsidiary-cdc.html (last visited Oct. 17, 
2011). 
 156. Id. 
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likely be preempted;157 however, these advisory opinions are not 
binding and may not accurately reflect the outcome of subsequent 
litigation.158 The mounting pressures on banks either to incorporate or to 
retain their subsidiaries will cause an increase in the cost of services 
offered to the public. 
The solution to this predicament is to reinstate Watters as the 
standard for subsidiary preemption. Reaffirming the Watters decision 
would afford protection to bank and thrift subsidiaries, while 
simultaneously shielding the public from predatory practices.159 Bank 
and thrift operating subsidiaries are an important aspect of our banking 
system. They allow banks to reach a wide market, provide flexibility of 
business and management structure, and reduce risks of business 
failure.160 Notwithstanding subsidiaries’ many benefits, the Dodd-Frank 
Act makes operating a subsidiary a nearly insurmountable task.161 
Opening the floodgates to differing laws from the fifty states 
undoubtedly will cause confusion for parent banks operating in a 
different state than their subsidiaries.162 The ensuing business and 
litigation expenses associated with compliance with state laws will 
cause many banks to determine that the cost of operating a subsidiary 
necessitates increased fees or reduced services.163  
                                                                                                                     
 157. Emma J. Hodson, Finding Middle Ground in the Preemption War Between States and 
Federal Financial Institutions: The Practical Limitations on State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Reardon, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 541, 547 (2009). 
 158. Office of Employee Benefits Security, Employee Benefit Plans, Advisory Opinion 
Procedure, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,821, 36,823 (Aug. 27, 1976), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
regulations/examinations/trustmanual/appendix_e/e_procedure.html.  
 159. Under Watters, bank and thrift subsidiaries would be subject to the Barnett Bank 
preemption rules in Dodd-Frank § 1044(a), which, in conjunction with the imposition of various 
obstacles to preemption, adequately safeguard against abusive federal practices. Supra Sections 
I.D, II.A. 
 160. Interview with Robert Taylor III, supra note 153.  
 161. States’ aggressive regulation of subsidiary activities that were once exempt from 
regulation will cause banks to incur substantial compliance costs. Williams, supra note 20, at 2–
4. 
 162. Supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 163. Defending broad federal preemption powers, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and 
Chief Counsel Julie L. Williams asserted:  
Adding layers of regulation brings added costs, which may lead to higher prices 
for customers. It may also have other undesirable collateral consequences, such 
as diminished product availability. For example, state and local laws that 
increase a bank’s costs and its potential liabilities in connection with subprime 
loans, which are already high risk, inevitably will cause some legitimate 
lenders to conclude that the cost and risks are not worth it. The result is 
diminished credit availability, and legitimate credit options that may otherwise 
be available to a segment of potentially credit-worthy subprime borrowers will 
be reduced. 
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Dodd-Frank’s tightened rules for preemption under section 1044(a) 
and its elimination of the OTS164 are sufficient measures to safeguard 
consumers from the plight of systemic risk and financial crisis. Moving 
forward, federal thrifts will no longer be able to claim field preemption 
over broad categories of state law.165 Conversely, courts making 
preemption determinations are now compelled to use the Barnett Bank 
standard on a case-by-case basis. 166 Therefore, courts have ample 
opportunity to assess the impact that bank practices have on society, 
rather than merely relying on only tenuously similar case law. The 
threshold question for thrift preemption is no longer whether the 
contested law “incidentally affect[s] the lending operations of Federal 
savings associations or [is] otherwise consistent with the purposes” of 
section 560.2(b) of the Code of Federal Regulations.167 Therefore, with 
many protective measures in place, it is unnecessary to subject 
subsidiaries to the whims of the states.168 Dodd-Frank’s headlong thrust 
of subsidiaries into the realm of state regulations is problematic for both 
banks’ business operations and consumers, to whom the costs of these 
problems are passed down.169  
Large, national financial institutions like Wells Fargo, which 
operates in thirty-nine states170 with subsidiaries throughout the 
country,171 will find the costs of doing business to be much greater after 
Dodd-Frank. Consider the holding in State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. 
District of Columbia, in which the court held a federal law preempted 
the District of Columbia Mortgage Lender and Broker Act (D.C. Act), 
which required “that individuals engaged in mortgage lending activities, 
including marketing and advertising, be licensed and trained, pay annual 
fees, and submit to general oversight by the Commissioner of Insurance, 
Securities, and Banking.”172 Here, the court relied on Watters to 
preempt the D.C. Act as it applied to State Farm Bank, a subsidiary of 
                                                                                                                     
Williams, supra note 21, at 4. 
 164. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code). 
 165. Id. (“This title does not occupy the field in any area of State law.”). 
 166. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 167. Applicability of Law, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2011); see also In re Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (2007) (upholding a state law 
forbidding deceptive acts and practices as within the ambit of state regulatory authority). 
 168. See supra notes 116–20. 
 169. Williams, supra note 20, at 4. 
 170. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., WELLS FARGO TODAY 3 (2011) https://www.wellsfargo.com/ 
downloads/pdf/about/wellsfargotoday.pdf. 
 171. National Bank Operating Subsidiary List (N-W), U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.helpwithmybank.gov/national-banks/operating-subsidiaries/national-banks-subsidiaries-n-
w.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 172. State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. D.C., 640 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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State Farm Mutual Insurance Corporation.173 Now that subsidiaries are 
regulated to the same extent as individuals and nonbank corporations, 
State Farm Bank would be compelled to comply with the D.C. Act. 
However, the complications do not end here. Similar to Washington, 
D.C., many states have laws governing mortgage-lending practices.174 
Subsidiaries, like State Farm Bank, would be required to comply with 
the intricacies of differing mortgage laws across state lines. This 
inevitably leads to extreme unpredictability for banks doing business on 
a national scale. 
To truly protect consumers from economic risks, Congress should 
return to the Watters paradigm. Subsidiaries, like parent banks, would 
then be subject to the Barnett Bank test.175 Even with Barnett Bank in 
place, state legislatures are able to circumvent federal preemption to 
promulgate laws in the best interest of their residents.176 In Kroske v. 
U.S. Bank Corp., the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim under the 
Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) prevailed over the 
NBA’s “dismiss at pleasure” provision.177 The Kroske court determined 
that the “provision of the WLAD prohibiting age discrimination [did] 
not conflict with the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act.”178 
As a result, the Washington legislature succeeded in safeguarding the 
interests of individuals within their state without drastically altering the 
business model of national banks. The states’ ability to further best 
banking practices is augmented by the burdens heaped on OCC 
preemption determinations by the Dodd-Frank Act.179 Moving forward, 
less deference will be given to the OCC, which, pursuant to the new 
reporting and five-year review requirements, will need to provide a 
valid reason for preemption determinations and will be under 
heightened scrutiny.180 With the already burdensome safeguards now 
established, there is little reason to overturn the Watters decision. 
Reestablishing the Watters test would submit subsidiaries to the same 
heightened scrutiny as parent banks and thrifts without shaking a bank’s 
entire business model to its core. This would provide more protection 
for consumers than existed before Dodd-Frank and would 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Id. at 23–24. 
 174. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 06.60.010 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-903 (2011); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-31-211 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-2208 (West 2010); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 445.1672a (2011). 
 175. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2007). 
 176. See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 987. 
 179. See supra notes 116–20. 
 180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code). 
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simultaneously shield consumers from the enormous internalized costs 
that will inevitably pass down through the system and emerge as 
increased administrative fees, raised interest rates, tightened due dates, 
and the elimination of free checking.181 Eliminating the Watters 
standard for subsidiary preemption is counterproductive to the goal of 
the Dodd-Frank Act: to protect consumers from uncertainty and turmoil 
in the financial industry.182  
CONCLUSION 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a highly debated piece of legislation that 
will undoubtedly lead to many lawsuits and tough decisions. As one of 
the most comprehensive legislative instruments of our time, it will also 
produce many positive outcomes, such as compelling banks to comply 
with state antipredatory lending laws,183 to which they were once 
immune.184 In drafting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress had the 
opportunity to establish safeguards against financial instability in the 
banking industry, while maintaining reasonable costs for consumers.185 
However, legislators chose a more radical approach186 by overturning 
the Watters holding.187 Although the Dodd-Frank Act does much to 
further consumer protection, Congress should retract section 5136C(e) 
from the National Bank Act and reinstate the Watters standard for 
regulation of operating subsidiaries.  
One of the more immediate and significant effects of the Dodd-
Frank Act is the elimination of the OTS and the abrupt shift of its 
responsibilities to the OCC.188 The resulting uncertainty about which 
laws are applicable to federal thrifts will force parent financial 
                                                                                                                     
 181. Williams, supra note 20, at 4. 
 182. DODD-FRANK: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 44–47. 
 183. Dodd-Frank Act § 1400 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
 184. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and Predatory 
Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 772 (2007) (citing Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 780 
N.Y.S.2d 266, 271–72 (2004) (concluding that both the NBA and HOLA preempted a New 
York antipredatory lending law)). 
 185. See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. State residents would be adequately 
protected under the Barnett Bank standard, which prevents operation of state law only to the 
extent that it irreconcilably conflicts with a federal regulation. Dodd-Frank’s new safeguards—
requiring the OCC to consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and to revisit its 
preemption determinations every five years—are enough to ensure that bank subsidiaries are not 
unnecessarily excused from state consumer protection laws. 
 186. Brennan & Musselman, supra note 55, at 1 (commenting on the Dodd-Frank’s altered 
preemption scheme that “[t]he result promises to be years of litigation to unravel precisely what 
state laws the National Bank Act preempts and—more importantly—what a national bank must 
do to comply with state laws”). 
 187. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (adding 
section 5136C(e) to the NBA). 
 188. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
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institutions to decide whether to subsume their subsidiaries or leave 
them subject to state regulations.189 In spite of the many conveniences 
that subsidiary status affords,190 national banks and thrifts may consider 
merging subsidiaries into their respective parent banks in order to assure 
long-term stability.191 Alternatively, banks that choose to retain their 
subsidiaries will compensate for the increased litigation and compliance 
costs by imposing greater fees for their services.192 Both options will 
cause consumers to be worse off than they otherwise would be under 
the Watters ruling. According to First Senior Deputy Comptroller and 
Chief Counsel Julie Williams in reference to increased preemption, the 
OCC’s “approach to combating abusive lending practices does not 
diminish credit access but does effectively target credit abuses.”193 
Congress’s decision to effectively overturn Watters ignores the long-
term complications and economic impacts that accompany such a 
drastic measure. Considering the substantial increase in operating costs 
and the incentive for financial institutions to “roll-up” subsidiaries, 
Congress deviated from the overall goal of consumer protection in 
overturning Watters. Accordingly, Congress should reinstate Watters 
and retract section 5136C(e) from the National Bank Act. 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Michael Hamburger, The Dodd-Frank Act and Federal Preemption of State Consumer 
Protection Laws, 128 BANKING L.J. 9, 18 (2011). 
 190. See supra notes 150–58 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
 192. “Banks will still need to be profitable. To the extent that regulation adds costs, they 
will be passed on to customers.” Interview with Robert Taylor III, supra note 153. 
 193. Williams, supra note 20, at 4. 
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